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I
These days it is common to see the divide between private and public law presented
as a fundamental distinction of English law. This is an interesting development
because it reflects a complete turnaround from what was considered until recently
one of English law’s defining characteristics. Furthermore, to the extent that people
have drawn the distinction between private and public law in the past, it was typically
in an attempt to point to the newly emerging public law and distinguish it from the
rest of the (private) law. Today, by contrast, it is more common to see the argument
pushed in the opposite direction, in an attempt to separate private law from the rest
of the (public) law. This, I will argue, is not simply a different way of telling the same
story.
Historically, English law did not recognize a division between private and public
law,1 and by the time we got to Dicey, this was not merely a recognized feature, but a
matter of national identity: ‘when we speak of “the rule of law” as a characteristic of
our country’, he wrote, ‘[w]e mean … that here every man, whatever be his rank or
condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the
jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals’.2 Dicey further explained that England did not
have anything ‘of the nature and principles of what is called in France droit
administratif’.3 These claims have come under attack over the years, but they have had
considerable staying power. For instance, in 1965 John Mitchell wrote an article that
described and criticized (as its title had it) ‘the causes and effects of the absence of a
system of public law in the United Kingdom’.4 As late as 1983 Lord Wilberforce
could express some reticence about ‘import[ations] into the law of England from
countries which, unlike our own, have separate systems concerning public law and
private law.’5
*
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1
See J.W.F. Allison, A Continental Distinction in the Common Law: A Historical and
Comparative Perspective on English Common Law (1996) 7-8. Allison further contends that the
‘categorical’ approach that the division between public and private law is only part of, is alien
to the common law. Ibid, 122-24. Here too, we see an interesting development as the
categorical or taxonomical approach has been at the heart of the emerging private law. See
note 8 below.
2
A.V. Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Constitution (1885) 177-78.
3
Id., 179.
4
J.D.B. Mitchell, ‘The Causes and Effects of the Absence of a System of Public Law in the
United Kingdom’ [1965] Public Law 95.
5
Davy v. Spelthorne Borough Council [1984] A.C. 262, 276 (Lord Wilberforce, dissenting).
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Despite this history, a group of scholars, whom I will henceforth collectively
designate ‘the Private Lawyers’, has sought to tell us that the distinction between
public and private law is one of English law’s foundational divides. For them,
insisting on this distinction marked the maturing of the English legal system from its
messy past into its more rationally ordered present. Peter Birks, the intellectual
leader of the Private Lawyers, believed that ‘[n]o department of human knowledge
ever advanced without attention to taxonomy’,6 and dedicated boundless energy to
identifying the ‘correct’ one. The most fundamental, axiomatic, distinction in his
classificatory scheme was between public and private law. As he put it, ‘[t]he whole
law is either public law or private law. There is no need to pause on this, nor to
investigate boundary disputes’.7 No excluded middle, no possible overlaps.
Against this ‘internal’ explanation of the rise of English private law, offered by
the Private Lawyers themselves and presented as reflecting the true nature of law, I
will offer a competing account. My account explains the emergence of private law in
terms of political changes in Britain; more specifically, my argument will aim to show
that, surprisingly, the emergence of private law as a separate domain of English law
has been grounded in the same political convictions that lay behind the view that a
century before led Dicey to reject the divide.8
My argument contains six steps. I start by presenting Dicey’s conception of
English law and show how it is related to his political and economic liberalism. I
argue that Dicey’s view of law was aligned with a conception of the state concerned
primarily with the protection of rights and not to the promotion of welfare. I then
argue that the emergence of the welfare state in the twentieth century forced not so
much abandonment of this conception of law but its reworking in order to
accommodate the development and increasing centrality of public law. A central
element of this reinterpretation of the Diceyean model involved the sharpening of
the division of labour between law-making (to be done by Parliament) and lawinterpretation and application (the job of courts). In the third step I argue that this
development put pressure on the common law and in particular on ‘private law’, for
6

P. Birks, ‘Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies’ (2000) 20 Oxford J. of Legal Studies 1, 37.
P. Birks, ‘Introduction’, in English Private Law, i (2000) xxxv, xxxvi.
8
There has been some critical work on the questionable assumptions of Private Lawyers’
taxonomical work. See J. Dietrich, ‘What Is “Lawyering”? The Challenge of Taxonomy’
(2006) 65 Cambridge Law J. 549; C. Webb, ‘Treating Like Cases Alike: Principle and
Classification in Private Law’, in A. Robertson & T.H. Wu (eds.), The Goals of Private Law
(2009) 215; S. Waddams, ‘Classification of Private Law in Relation to Historical Evidence:
Description, Prescription, and Conceptual Analysis’ (2004) 6 Current Legal Issues 265. While
they have shown how one needs a perspective from which to conduct a taxonomical exercise,
what they have not shown is how the felt need for taxonomy, and the most basic taxonomical
division—between public and private law—are themselves products of the political structure
in which English law operates. American law, for example, where pressures were very
different accords much less place for the public law/private law divide. There, well-known
critiques of the divide have been made as early as the 1920s. See M.R. Cohen, ‘Property and
Sovereignty’ (1927) 13 Cornell Law Rev. 8; R.L. Hale, ‘Coercion and Distribution in a
Supposedly Non-Coercive State’ (1923) 38 Politcal Science Q. 470.
7
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these were areas where law-making traditionally resided with the courts. As a result
what may have seemed unproblematic before now threatened the legitimacy of these
areas of law. I argue that the emergence of private law was a response to this
challenge. I describe the development of both theoretical ideas and practical
solutions that were meant to address this challenge. In the fourth step I argue that
these solutions were remarkably similar to Dicey’s conception of law. In other words,
I argue that the effort to identify English private law as distinct from public law were
made by adopting on a smaller scale a Diceyean conception of law previously meant
to describe the whole of English law. This implies, in the fifth and possibly most
contestable step in my argument, that the means by which private law was supposed
to overcome the legitimacy challenge were unsuccessful. Despite its proponents’
aspirations for developing a non-political law, the work of many Private Lawyers
reveals the same political ideology found in Dicey’s work. In the final step, I consider
the possible implications to be drawn from this for the future development of private
law.

II
The British welfare state was a long time in the making; it did not appear fully
formed after the Beveridge Report. And yet, for all the talk of the 1834 Poor Laws or
the Victorian origins of the British welfare state, in 1885, when the first edition of
Dicey’s Lectures was published, the British state was still small by contemporary
standards. At the time, many among the intellectual elites still considered state
intervention suspect.9 Dicey was an enthusiastic supporter of this small state and the
laissez faire ideology that joined it. He counted among its virtues that it ‘stimulated
energy of action[,] … left room for freedom of thought and individuality[,] … has
fostered trust in self-help[, and] … has kept alive emphatically the virtues of the
English people’.10 He contrasted all this with what he took to be the mistaken belief
that ‘law can benefit the people as much as does the maintenance of personal
freedom’.11 Law, in short, could and should be used to protect individual rights, not
to promote general welfare.12

9

See P. Harling, The Modern British State: An Historical Introduction (2001) ch. 3; J. Harris,
Private Lives, Public Spirit: Britain 1870–1914 (1993) 197-200. Interestingly, both Harling (at
p. 73) and Harris (at p. 184) stress a model of (respectively) a ‘disinterested state’ or ‘a
neutral, passive, almost apolitical state’ as the hallmark of the Victorian state, a model
reproduced in Private Lawyers’ conception of private law. See text to note 89 below.
10
A.V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation between Law and Public Opinion in England During the
Nineteenth Century (1914, 2nd ed.) lxxi.
11
Id., lxxiii.
12
On the extent to which Dicey’s reading of the English constitution was a product of his
political commitments see B.J. Hibbits, ‘The Politics of Principle: Albert Venn Dicey and the
Rule of Law’ (1994) 23 Anglo-American Law Rev. 1; see also W.I. Jennings, ‘In Praise of Dicey:
1885-1935’ (1935) 13 Public Administration 123, 128.
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In his Law and Public Opinion Dicey identified the rise of collectivism around the
1870s,13 a development Dicey thought was inconsistent with the individualism he
took to be a national English trait. I mention this not because Dicey’s broad
historical sweep has been universally accepted, but because it reflects his perception
of the proper role for law to play. With the rise of collectivism Dicey saw danger to
liberty, and he was wary of courts’ feeble stand to protect it. He acknowledged that
the cause of freedom was secured by favourable public opinion, but he sought
stronger protection through the law, as ‘[p]ublic opinion is … no sound basis on
which to rest as a security against the practical operation of laws which in theory are
not favourable to freedom.’14
One way of understanding Dicey’s work on the constitution, then, is as an
attempt to inculcate a vision of law that helps protect these freedoms. Dicey saw a
clear tie between the (English) rule of law, political freedom and economic
liberalism.15 For Dicey this concept denoted the fact that in English law ‘the
principles of private law have with us been by the action of the Courts and
Parliament so extended as to determine the position of the Crown and of its servants;
thus the constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the land’.16 What this meant
was that the solution to what Dicey called the growth of ‘collectivism’ was not to be
resolved by extending and reinforcing judicial supervision (what we would now call
‘administrative law’) over otherwise unrestrained (discretionary) government action,
but by means of limiting government powers to those given to individuals. These
common law limits on the development of the law were premised on the idea that
individual freedom is paramount, and that the clarity and fixity provided by judgemade law ‘promotes justice more than good laws [i.e., statutes] which are liable to
change or modification’.17
Perhaps more surprisingly given how much the notion of Parliamentary
sovereignty is now associated with Dicey, he was wary of it. A principle that ‘as an
abstract doctrine’ might ‘command the acquiescent admiration of the commentator’
13

Dicey, n. 10, pp. 64-65, lectures VII-VIII.
A.V. Dicey, ‘The Legal Boundaries of Liberty’ (1868) 13 Fortnightly Review (n.s.) 1, 13;
Dicey expressed the same view many years later. See A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the
Law of the Constitution (1915, 8th ed.) xxxvii.
15
Dicey, n. 10, pp. 175-76, where Dicey ties the rule of law with individual freedom, and
‘Benthamism’ (which elsewhere, id., 44, 145, he equated with laissez faire ideology).
16
A.V. Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885) 216.
17
Dicey, n. 10, p. 366. In the choice between these two models of checking government
power—either by setting limits on what government can do on the basis of principles
applicable to everyone or by developing special principles for limiting executive action—
Dicey may have been more attracted to the former, because of its better fit to his model of the
rule of law. But this choice, made on the basis of a desire to limit government, may have led,
paradoxically, to the opposite result. Once Parliament granted powers to executive agencies,
there was virtually nothing (outside of feeble Parliamentary control) to check them. Thus,
Dicey’s influential views on the inexistence of administrative law within English law may have
led to a retardation of judicial developments, thereby making it easier for executive power to
grow without control.
14
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was in reality ‘an instrument well adapted for the establishment of democratic
despotism’.18 It is for this reason that he looked favourably to the United States and
its written, entrenched, constitution. There, he saw a regime in which the rule of law
meant judicial supremacy. As he saw it, the US Constitution provided a safeguard
‘against the promotion of that constant legislative activity which is a characteristic
feature of modern English life’,19 perhaps especially so in a period when a majority
on the United States Supreme Court was similarly sympathetic towards economic
liberalism.20
A conservative, Dicey preferred the ‘slow and sure kind of progress which alone
has the remotest chance of producing fundamental and beneficial social changes’,21
and believed that it was judge-made law that was more likely to achieve this goal. But
it was not just conservatism. Dicey believed that the common law was committed to
equality in a way that legislation was not: its substantive rules applied to everyone—
private individual or public body—in the same way.22 This allowed it to be principled
in a way that legislation could not. ‘Even ordinary judicial legislation is logical, the
best judicial legislation is scientific’.23 By contrast, ‘Parliament in most instances pays
little regard to any general principle’; rather, it ‘attempts to meet the easiest and
most off-hand manner some particular grievance or want’, and for this reason ‘can at
best be called only tentative’.24 That is why he thought common law principles were
more likely to promote the common good; by contrast, ‘in matters of legislation men
are guided in the main by their real or apparent interest’ and not ‘in accordance
with their opinion as to what is a good law’.25

III
Dicey’s view was an influential articulation of a prevailing view among legal elites
about the relationship between law and state. But the British state was changing. The
liberal welfare reforms starting in 1906 had a noticeable effect, and were difficult to
reconcile with the picture of law as (merely) the protector or rights. These changes
called for a reaction and possibly a change. In an article published in 1915 Dicey
recognized that ‘the nation as represented in Parliament has undertaken to perform
18

Id., 305-06. Dicey invokes here Bentham’s ‘sinister interest’, but turns it on its head.
For Bentham the sinister interest was reason to limit the common law courts and to expand
democracy, Dicey saw in it the reason to turn to the courts, which he thought much less
corrupt (and corruptible) than legislatures. Cf. A.V. Dicey, ‘Judicial Policy’ (1874) 29
Macmillan’s Mag 473, 473-74.
19
Dicey, n. 10, p. 9; see also H.A. Tulloch, ‘Changing British Attitudes towards the
United States in the 1880s’ (1977) 20 Historical J. 825, 837-38; Hibbits, n. 12, pp. 28-29.
20
See Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1837–1937 (1991) 181-82.
21
Dicey, n. 10, pp. lxxxvii-lxxxviii.
22
Dicey, n. 16, pp. 177-78.
23
Dicey, n. 10, p. 371 note 1; see also Hibbits, n. 12, p. 12.
24
Dicey, n. 10, pp. 370-71 note 1.
25
Id., 12.
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a large number of duties with which before the Reform Act of 1832 no English
government had any concern whatever.’26 Though unhappy about these
developments, he tried to console himself that the developing law to limit
government action fell short of ‘true droit administratif’ because government action
was still tried in the ‘ordinary law courts’.27 Though he no longer could say that the
substantive rules applicable to the government were the same common law rules
which governed individuals, he could still make the weaker claim that English law did
not have specialized tribunals dealing with claims against the state.28 Even at the time
this effort seemed strained and with the growth of state institutions and the greater
discretionary powers given to bureaucrats, Dicey’s idea of the rule of law proved
difficult to sustain. One had to either give up on the idea that the same law must be
applied to all, or develop new doctrines of administrative law to guarantee that
government officials were constrained by law. The former would have implied
putting much government action effectively above the law, the latter required
abandoning the legal equality between private individuals and public bodies that
Dicey considered a hallmark of the (English) rule of law. Either way, a central tenet
of his original conception of the rule of law had to be abandoned.
Legal solutions to new problems are rarely completely novel and this one was no
exception. It was built out of the building blocks of another central ingredient of
Dicey’s account, Parliamentary sovereignty. The origins of Parliamentary sovereignty
are, of course, much older than late Victorian Britain,29 but the idea grew in
significance with the advent of the welfare state, for it was then that the potential
clash between law (and the rule of law) and government became evident. The
reconciliation of the concern about the loss of freedoms that came with expanding
state powers and the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty called for a division of
labour between political and legal critique. More specifically, the solution adopted
was a kind of compromise between what I will call, departing from prevailing usage,
‘public law’ and ‘administrative law’. By the former term I mean the law directed at
the government and concerned with maintaining the security and welfare of the
general population; by the latter, I mean the law concerned with setting limits on the
way these laws are actually implemented. Broadly speaking the solution involved a
division of labour between public law—the substantive law of public bodies—which
26

A.V. Dicey, ‘The Development of Administrative Law in England’ (1915) 31 Law Q.
Rev. 148, 149. The last edition of Dicey’s Law of the Constitution to be published in his lifetime
came out in the same year. It contains a long introduction which reads like a lament for lost
verities,
27
Id., 152.
28
Others were even less complacent than him, expressing concern about the creation of
new tribunals outside the ordinary court system. See W.J.L. Ambrose, ‘The New Judiciary’
(1910) 26 Law Q. Rev. 203, which saw with alarm the fact that administrative bodies have
been given what were essentially judicial powers. This view was then trumpeted with much
greater fanfare in Lord Hewart, The New Despotism (1929).
29
On the decline of the idea of fundamental law that can trump Parliamentary
legislation see Bernard Baylin, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (1992, rev. ed.)
198-202; J.W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History (1961, rev. ed.) ch. 12.
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was considered largely off-limits for the courts, and administrative law—the law of
administrative process. Courts had relatively little to do with the content of public
law, but they took upon themselves the task of developing and enforcing a body of
legal principles dealing with administering it.
However politically unhappy some economic liberals may have been about the
growth of the state, Parliamentary sovereignty left them bereft of legal means for
attacking these developments. The lawyers who waged the rear-guard battle against
the administrative state could not object to the fact that Parliament now adopted
legislation they did not approve of. Instead, they concentrated their efforts on
controlling the unconstrained discretionary power to bureaucrats. Lord Hewart, for
instance, may have been unhappy about the content of much of the new welfare
legislation, but in The New Despotism he complained about something else, namely the
allocation of decision-making power without limit or control, or as he called it,
‘administrative lawlessness’.30 Contrary to Dicey, Hewart contrasted English law
unfavourably with French administrative law. When the French spoke of droit
administrative, he said, they had real law in mind: ‘The essential idea which underlies
and gives meaning to droit administratif is not that State officials … are above the
law…. It is rather that the position and liabilities of State officials, and the rights and
liabilities of private individuals in their dealings with officials as such, form a separate
and distinct chapter of law’.31 The French system was therefore one of ‘true
“administrative law,” administered by a tribunal which applies judicial methods of
procedure’.32 This is what English lawyers had to develop.
Put differently, the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty is the reason why one
cannot speak of an English Lochner33 era, i.e. an era of court-imposed legal limits on
the permissible growth of state powers and institutions. But unlike the abnegating
position Parliamentary sovereignty implied in relation to the substantive powers
given by legislation to the executive branch, the doctrine of Parliamentary
sovereignty proved a fruitful basis for developing the doctrines of administrative law.
Doing so required reconciling the idea—very much at the core of Parliamentary
sovereignty—that courts do not make rules, only interpret them. This was done in
two ways. First, these new rules of administrative law that the courts did develop were
not conceived of as an incursion into the domain the substantive public law; they
were merely rules, derived from traditional common law doctrines, on how public
law is to be fairly maintained. Second, the justification for these new rules was itself
30

Hewart, n. 28, p. 43, passim.
Id., 37, also id., 39-40, 45. Hewart is sometimes quoted saying ‘Between the rule of law
and what is called “administrative law” (happily there is no English name for it there is the
sharpest possible contrast)’. Id., 35. Taken out of context this sentence gives a rather
misleading impression of the book’s message.
32
Id., 39. Writing around the same time others expressed similar ideas. See J.A.R.
Marriott, English Political Institutions (1938, 4th ed.) xli-xlii; C.K. Allen, Bureaucracy Triumphant
(1931).
33
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Roberts v. Hopwood [1925] A.C. 578, conveyed
a similar sentiment, but it involved local government policy, not Parliamentary legislation.
31

7

grounded in the idea of Parliamentary sovereignty. Courts could inspect the way
legislative power was exercised in order to make sure that the executive did not
exceed powers granted to it by the legislature. As such, administrative law could have
been (and was) explained as an affirmation of Parliamentary sovereignty.34 In Taylor
v. Brighton Borough Council Lord Greene MR is reported to have said during oral
argument: ‘The common law does not control Parliament, and if Parliament confers
on a Minister a power to make regulations how can the court inquire into those
regulations beyond ascertaining whether they are within the power?’35 This brief
statement exemplifies how both the justification and the limits of judicial review
could be explained in terms of Parliamentary sovereignty.

IV
It is this socio-political transformation that sets the background for the emergence,
in fits and starts, of the doctrines we now call ‘administrative law’. This background is
worth mentioning within an account of the development of English private law,
because it shows how these new doctrines addressed the problem of controlling a
growing executive branch within a theoretical framework that addressed concerns
about courts’ political legitimacy in doing so. I will argue that we can find similar
concerns in the development of English private law. That development itself is a bit
of a surprise. With administrative law doctrines (such as ultra vires) having grown out
of more traditional common law principles,36 the divide between public law and
private law was considered useful for organizational and pedagogical purposes, but it
was not taken to reflect a substantive divide in the law.37 What is distinctive about the
emergence of English private law is the claims made by academic lawyers working in
property, tort, contract, restitution (and perhaps also trusts) that together these
branches of law constituted a distinct and substantively different division of the law.
Private law was not just a collective name to gather otherwise diverse areas of law;
there was, rather, a certain idea of private law that unified these areas of law and gave
them distinct meaning and content. Departures from what was described as ‘the law’s
true essence’ in these areas, failure to understand what private law or any its

34

Dicey, n. 26, p. 151. Whether ultra vires still explains the theoretical foundation of
judicial review, a question that has been the subject of considerable debate, is not a question I
will address here.
35
[1947] K.B. 736, 739 (CA).
36
D. Oliver, ‘What, If Any, Public–Private Divide Exists in English Law?’ in M. Ruffert
(ed.), The Public–Private Law Divide: Potential for Transformation (2009) 1, 3-5.
37
English academics in the early twentieth century saw the distinction as merely a matter
of ‘convenience’. See Allison, n. 1, pp. 8-11, 124. Even much more recently this view still has
its defenders. See C. Harlow, ‘“Public” and “Private” Law: Definition without Distinction’
(1980) 43 Modern Law Rev. 241; Oliver, n. 36, p. 16 (‘we have, at most, some separate
substantive and adjectival public laws, but we do not have a coherent divide between public
and private law or laws.’).
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branches ‘genuinely’ were, inevitably ‘distorted’, ‘debased’ and ‘manipulated’ the
law.38
I do not claim that those who made these claims did not believe them; but I do
believe that the unity they claimed for private law was the outcome of their effort to
understand the law in a particular way, and hence was more manufactured than
natural: it was not an inherent feature of private law, but the conclusions of their
efforts to mould private law in a particular way. And just as the rise of public law
could be explained as a response to a changing socio-political environment, so was
the impetus for doing so in private law. My first step in challenging the conceptual
story about private law will be to show that the reason for the new demarcation
between public and private law has been a concern with the political legitimacy of
courts having almost exclusive control over the development of the law in this area. I
therefore argue that the emergence of private law as a distinct category of English
law at the particular time that it did, is better explained not by lawyers’ sudden
realization of the true nature of (English) law (a nature that somehow eluded
English lawyers of past centuries) but by the changing political environment at a
particular time in history.
As already mentioned, the combination of the doctrine of Parliamentary
sovereignty and the modern regulatory state has resulted in the familiar division of
labour between Parliament and courts, and the boundary line between what I called
public law and administrative law was developed to match those limits. The problem
with private law was that it seemed to flout this divide, as here was a large area of law
about which it was difficult to say that the courts were not involved in making law.
Against a background in which substantive rules were now considered properly to
belong to the legislature, there was a need to justify leaving much of the law-making
power in this area of law in the hands of the courts and explain how this was
consistent with the supremacy of Parliament. I will call this ‘the Political Legitimacy
Problem’.
At its most abstract, a solution to this problem had to show that the common law
was not political. In a post-legal realist, post-CLS world, this was a difficult claim to
defend,39 and I will argue that separating private law from public law was an
important element in this endeavour. One of the distinctive marks of private law in
the eyes of the Private Lawyers was its separateness from politics, both from within—
38
The quoted words come from M. McInnes, ‘Resisting Temptations to “Justice”’, in R.
Chambers et al. (eds.), The Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment (2009) 100,
101, 127, and N.J. McBride, ‘Rights and the Basis of Tort Law’, in D. Nolan & A. Robertson
(eds.), Rights in Private Law (2011) 331, 332, 361. Additional examples of this attitude are
found in text accompanying notes 40-41 below.
39
As acknowledged in P. Birks ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’
(1996) 26 U. of Western Australia Law Rev. 1, 4, 98 (‘The [legal] realists and post-realists …
have a strong hand’). In the United States, due to a different political tradition and a
stronger influence of legal realism, the solution was quite different. Cf. D. Priel, ‘Is There
One Right Answer to the Question of the Nature of Law?’, in W. Waluchow & S. Sciaraffa
(eds.), The Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law (2012) 322.
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the nature of private law or of its branches was the product of conceptual analysis,
not political theory—but also from without. If much public law came to reflect
shifting political ideology, to stay private and distinct, private law had to be insulated
from ‘distorting’ influences coming from public law. In what follows I identify four
strategies for addressing the Political Legitimacy Problem. Though there is some
overlap between these ideas, for analytical purposes I consider them below
separately.
(a) Judges don’t make law. To make sense of this idea in the context of the
common law required resorting to the old notion according to which court decisions
were not themselves the law, but merely a reflection or evidence of the law. This view
may sound outdated, but consider the claim made recently by Nicholas McBride that
there is ‘absence of any understanding among the judges as to what tort law is for’.40
Tort law is thus presented not as a product of the work of the courts, but as some
idea that exists prior to and outside of the courts, such that if the courts fail to
identify it, that in no way shapes tort law, but rather shows that the courts have made
a mistake. In a similar fashion Andrew Burrows has recently attacked the Australian
High Court and to a lesser degree the House of Lords for failing follow the real law
of restitution.41 Despite allegedly claiming to merely organize and present the law as
it is found in courts decisions, Burrows’s position presupposes that the true law of
restitution is for the courts to discover and follow, not to create. At times the view
that judges do not make law is defended even more explicitly. Birks chastised the
House of Lords decision that departed from an earlier decision for claiming to have
changed the law. This, said Birks, is the proper domain of the legislature. He said
this in spite of the 1966 practice statement, and the fact that the doctrine the House
was departing from was itself the creation of the court.42
On this view, the true principles of private law somehow pre-exist their judicial
enunciation, and therefore identifying them does not violate democratic principles.
Nonetheless, I think that of all strategies of defending the distinctness of private law,
this has been the least popular, perhaps because virtually all the senior British
judiciary have expressed the view that they do make law.43
(b) The separation between law-as-will and law-as-reason. This approach is in some
respects a variant of the previous one, or perhaps an attempt to explain it, but it also
contains something else, namely a more explicit recounting of two competing
theories of authority. According to one, which we may call the Hobbesian view, ‘it is
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not Wisdom, but Authority that makes a Law’.44 To the extent that the common law is
law, it is because it is accepted by an act of will of a political authority. The alternative
view, which we may call the Cokean view, is that it is the reason of the law, and more
precisely, the artificial reason of the law that gives it its authority. The latter view
need not deny that judges in some sense make law, but it insists that they make law in
a particular way, one that is different from the way legislatures make law, and for this
reason is less open to the Political Legitimacy Problem. Judge-made law is not law in
virtue of an act of will, but in virtue of its rational force.45 If Hobbes’s Dialogue has the
student of the common law argue that law is all reason and Hobbes’s alter ego
respond that all law is an act of will, the divide could be revitalized in modern times
by splitting the difference: public law (much of it legislatively-created, thus reflecting
the shifting political aims of different governments) is put on the side of will, private
law is placed on the side of reason.
One easily finds statements from Private Lawyers that convey this idea. The
‘common law is based on reason’46 we are told by Private Lawyers, and as ‘Reason
legitimates’ and ‘Reason communicates’47 it provides an independent source of
legitimacy to private law, regardless of its popular appeal. A slightly different
example comes from Burrows’s statement that ‘for the common law to react
according to the political fad of the moment would be to contradict its very
essence’.48 Such a view, that seeks to exclude democracy from the common law (and
that is what is being excluded, even if it is disparagingly described as ‘the political fad
of the moment’) is supported by the view that unlike the principles that ground law,
which can be fairly easily determined and objectively validated, in the domain of
politics (of will) there are only subjective preferences.49
The distinction between will and reason is related to another distinction,
mentioned earlier, between law as concerned with the protection of rights and law as
concerned with the promotion of welfare. To its proponents, the former is an area of
law that can begin from relatively uncontroversial premises and derive detailed
conclusions through conceptual analysis and deductive logic, while the latter is the
domain in which law serves to formally institutionalize competing political views on
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which (so the thought might be) there can be no rational argument.50 Especially
among defenders of the view that tort law is concerned with the protection of rights,
one finds support for the view that what rights we have is a matter that can be
determined fairly uncontroversially.51
(c) Private law depends on pre-political (moral) common sense. A different solution to
the Problem of Political Legitimacy is asserting that private law finds its foundations
in common sense morality. Thus, Robert Stevens tells us that ‘it is unnecessary to be
a profound thinker’52 to understand and justify tort law, and for this reason the
subject is ‘much more boring than is commonly supposed’.53 This view can be traced
back to the idea, expressed among others by Blackstone, that the common law is
nothing but shared custom, that its authority ‘rests entirely upon general reception
and usage’, and that its content is proven by ‘shewing that it hath been always the
custom to observe it’.54 Thus, the content of tort law can be ‘deduced from the
nature and experience of ourselves, and the world and society in which we live in’.55
This solution presupposes that common sense is roughly the same for all, so that
virtually everyone will reach the same answer on these questions. For this reason we
can take deciding on these matters from democratic majorities without worrying
about violating Parliamentary supremacy.
(d) Private law is a matter of legal expertise. An altogether different response tries to
solve the Political Problem by arguing that private law is the product of disinterested,
and politically neutral, expertise. Birks, the most vigorous defender of this position,
has clearly seen this view as very different from the common sense view just
considered. He warned that ‘the community’s sense of justice is prone to
pathological lapses’.56 Nor, in his view, is appeal to moral intuition any better.57 For
him, the true mark of the rule of law is legal expertise shielded, as much as possible,
50
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from such influences. In what he called a ‘democratic bargain[,] … some part of
[the demos’] power shall be ceded to unrepresentative experts whose expertise
consists in the interpretation of the law’; in return, the experts’ side of the bargain is
that ‘they will not usurp the functions of the representative legislature’.58 To achieve
that, the legal experts must be ‘doing something different from the legislator and
something that cannot be done by just any commuter on the Clapham bus’.59 If the
former is the domain of political will and the latter the place of unconstrained
intuition, the lawyers’ answer must be based on ‘hard-won mastery of … specialised
rationality’.60
Birks clearly echoes here Coke’s artificial reason of the law,61 not Blackstone’s
vision of the common law as reflecting custom. Here, law—or more precisely private
law—can maintain its separateness from politics and thus overcome the Political
Legitimacy Problem by being turned into an almost technocratic enterprise. ‘But for
the need to retain a trace of normativity’ Birks said when discussing unjust
enrichment, ‘one might just as well speak of pink enrichment’.62 The task of the
jurist is to develop an elaborate taxonomic ‘map’ of the law, one in which all possible
events are classified. Subsequently, all that would remain is to place any given event
in its correct category, its right place on the map. Not just the task of application but
even the map-making itself had to be a matter of technical expertise: it should be
done by ‘look[ing] downwards to the cases’, not by appealing to some ‘unknowable
justice in the sky’.63

V
None of the ideas considered in the last section is entirely new; but they were all
refocused by the Private Lawyers to the domain of private law. In this way they have
sought to establish a clear divide between private law and public law for the sake of
justifying leaving the central law-making power in this area of law to the judges.
These, if you wish, were the Private Lawyers’ responses to an English version of a
countermajoritarian difficulty.
Ideas, however, are not enough. In addition to these theoretical responses, the
Private Lawyers have considered various institutional mechanisms meant to guard
the common law from politicization and in this way keep private law apart. I consider
six of them below.
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(a) The depoliticization of judicial appointments. Judicial appointments in the early
twentieth century were highly politicized. Legal acumen or respect in legal circles did
not count for much in senior judicial positions; the right political connections and
views did. And then, rather swiftly, procedures changed.64 The new settlement
coincided with a turn towards the professionalization of the judiciary and the
retrenchment of the idea that judicial appointments and promotion should be based
on legal acumen, not party affiliation. Today Private Lawyers draw an explicit link
between their conception of private law and a non-politically appointed judiciary.65
(b) The separation of the common law and legislation. English courts have adopted
various doctrines to limit the potential influence of statute on the development of
the common law. The best known is that statutes in derogation of the common law
should be strictly interpreted. More interesting are the reactions of judges to the
suggestion that the courts should develop common law doctrines by analogy from
legislation. The Court of Appeal has responded to this idea stating that it has
‘nothing to commend it but its audacity’.66 Plainly, this is not the only possible
approach,67 but the distrust of the products of the legislature,68 compared with the
unbridled faith in the powers of the courts,69 cannot be separated from some of the
more theoretical claims considered in the previous section. They sit particularly well
with the theoretical suggestions made in the last section that the common law
reflects reason whereas legislation is ‘short-term party politics’.70
(c) Self-imposed limits on the scope of judicial innovation. English common law judges
used to be innovators. With little forewarning and not much fanfare they invented
64
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new torts such as the tort of inducing breach of contract, intentional infliction of
mental injury, and a tort protecting against losses from substances escaping from
neighbouring property. Somewhere in the middle of the twentieth century, with a
few exceptions, English judges became much less willing to innovate in this way.71
Viscount Simonds reflected the new mood:
For to me heterodoxy, or, as some might say, heresy, is not the more attractive because
it is dignified by the name of reform. Nor will I easily be led by an undiscerning zeal
for some abstract kind of justice to ignore our first duty, which is to administer justice
according to law, the law which is established for us by Act of Parliament or the
binding authority of precedent. The law is developed by the application of old
principles to new circumstances. Therein lies its genius. Its reform by the abrogation of
those principles is the task not of the courts of law but of Parliament.72

This attitude is definitely still with us. Think of the endless judicial
procrastination over whether there is a tort of infringement of privacy. A more
specific, astounding, recent example is the decision in Jain v. Trent Strategic Health
Authority.73 Despite having no legal constraint limiting them from reshaping an
earlier law which was exclusively created by the courts, a unanimous House of Lords
reached a decision that all members of the panel considered unjust. The only way to
make sense of that decision is that Law Lords felt that changing or adjusting a
judicially-created doctrine to reach what they believed was a better outcome, would
undermine their legitimacy more than handing down an unjust decision.
(d) Deciding cases on principle, not policy. Private Lawyers have argued that courts
should not rely on policy considerations in private law, with one of them going so far
as describing doing so ‘an admission of failure’.74 The failure in question is the
failure to show how purely legal considerations can answer the question of
individuals’ rights and duties towards each other (as well as individuals rights and
duties towards the state).
(It is worth noting parenthetically that though Private Lawyers may seem to
follow the courts’ reluctance to addressing political questions in cases of negligence
liability involving public authorities, the two approaches are quite different. The
Private Lawyers adopt here something like Ronald Dworkin’s distinction regarding
the kind of considerations courts should rely on. Courts sometimes follow a different
idea, one that has some links to the work of Fuller,75 which is concerned with the
kind of disputes courts should consider. Disputes that are deemed predominantly
‘political’ (perhaps because polycentric) are also considered inappropriate for
71
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judicial decision. Whatever are the merits of this latter view, it does not entail the
complete exclusion of policy.)
(e) The separation of public and private duties. Historically, there was no clear
distinction between public and private duties (and correspondingly between public
and private rights).76 From the 1970s courts and commentators have begun
distinguishing between private and public duties: for a public body to have a public
law duty does not imply that failing to comply with it can give rise for a claim for
compensation. This can be so only if the public duty is also a private law duty.
Whatever one thinks of this distinction it has one practical effect, and that is to keep
private law and public law apart. While complete separation here is difficult to
maintain, the prevailing view among Private Lawyers has been that it is a mistake to
infer a private right (on in other words, a tort law action) from a violation of a public
duty.77 On this interpretation public bodies’ public duties do not give rise and do not
in any way shape the private law duties of public bodies, so that their private duties
are identical to those of individuals. That, however, is not the only possible
interpretation of their relationship. A different interpretation, favoured by Lord
Atkin, was that the public duties of public authorities give shape to their private law
duties.78
(f) Academic emphasis on doctrinal scholarship and education in private law.
prominent Private Lawyers like Peter Birks have played a leading role in the effort to
maintain private law scholarship and education as heavily focused on doctrinal
analysis. In this way they sought to prevent the infiltration into private law of ideas
from theoretical approaches that often challenged the divide between public and
private law. Indeed, whereas in public law there was growing influence from political
theory, political science, and other areas that have highlighted the political nature of
public law, the emphasis on doctrinal scholarship in the areas of contract, tort,
restitution, and property law (while ignoring non-doctrinal work on these areas of
law), has served to maintain the goal of keeping private law away from the touch of
legislatures. Notice that insisting on doctrinal scholarship requires an extra step from
the claim that courts should limit themselves to traditional legal materials and to
narrow considerations pertaining only to the parties before them. One may well
favour an approach in which scholars take broad normative considerations into
76
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account for the sake of creating the kind of rules that will then relieve the courts of
the need to engage in such questions. But in reality such a separation between
academic and judicial work is hard to maintain. By insisting on the primacy of
doctrinal scholarship, by engaging in it, one can maintain the idea that a nonpolitical private law is possible, and therefore that the courts can be kept in charge of
it. In this way, doctrinal scholarship served, among other things, as a response to the
Problem of Political Legitimacy.

VI
There are several ironies in this story. One is that defenders of English private law,
who often insist on the theoretical difference between English private law and the
private law of civilian countries,79 end up with a view of law that bears unmistakable
similarity to civil law models and is quite different from traditional common law.
With their insistence on a clear distinction between private and public law, and of
the former as a domain of pure law unadulterated by policy, with their emphasis on
(seemingly) politically-neutral conceptual analysis, the Private Lawyers end up close
to late nineteenth century German Begriffsjurisprudenz (jurisprudence of concepts).80
Closer to our subject, a surprising conclusion from the previous discussion is that
contemporary Private Lawyers can see themselves as the true heirs of Dicey. That may
seem counterintuitive at first: Dicey insisted that in English law there was no
distinction between private and public law, while they argue the exact opposite. One
way of understanding my argument is that after Dicey’s battle against public law has
been lost, Private Lawyers have sought to maintain an enclave of the Diceyean
conception of law within one corner of a legal system that’s increasingly different
from Dicey’s image of English law.81
Consider the three components of Dicey’s account of the rule of law: the
presentation of discretion (as manifested in administrative bodies) as contrary to law;
the equality in the law applicable to everyone including, especially, the law applied to
public bodies; and the suggestion that foundational principles of English
constitutional law are derived from court decisions deciding cases rather than from
general declarations in constitutional documents.
79
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All three are preserved, and forcefully defended, by contemporary Private
Lawyers. The idea that discretion is opposed to the rule of law is clearly stated by
Birks who said that ‘[Judges’] authority is legitimated by their expertise. A rational
rule of law has to have its experts. Community justice does not. Discretionary
remedialism takes one long step away from the rationality of the rule of law and
towards direct access to the community’s sense of justice’.82 The view that private law
is committed to a form of equality because it treats everyone in the same way, has
been repeatedly stated by Private Lawyers.83 At a lower level of abstraction, much of
the domain of negligence liability of public authorities as analysed by Private Lawyers
is subsumed under the general category of omissions, because, we are told, the law in
this area ‘applies just as much to public bodies as it does to private persons’.84 Lord
Hoffmann, probably the most sympathetic and prominent proponent of Private
Lawyers’ ideas among the English judiciary in recent years, has similarly expressed
the view that in this area of law public authorities were (and should be) ‘treated in
exactly the same way as if it had been a private citizen’.85
Finally, just as the Diceyean English constitution is inferred from judicial
decisions determining the rights of private individuals and not from general
declaratory documents, Private Lawyers have expressed the view that the rights and
duties that they believe are at the core of private law are properly derived from
individual cases. For instance, Stevens tells us that tort law ‘is concerned with the
vindication of our rights’. He went on to say that ‘abolishing the law of torts
altogether … would mean the abolition of most of our legal rights’.86 On this view
our (primary) legal rights are necessarily constituted by tort law as developed by the
courts dealing with cases, and it is impossible for them to be created elsewhere—why
else would the abolition of tort law in favour of, say, a social compensation scheme
entail the abolition of our legal right to bodily integrity? Another manifestation of
this attitude is found in Private Lawyers’ vehement opposition to the codification of
private law. Burrows called binding codes ‘dangerous’, without any evidence that
codification both in and outside the common law world has had any negative effect
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on the development of law in those jurisdictions.87 Even Birks, an otherwise
unwavering admirer of civilian ways, was unsympathetic to codification.88
By itself, the similarity between the Private Lawyers’ conception of private law
and Dicey’s understanding of law (in general) could be considered of limited
historical interest. Indeed, my claims about the origins of private law thinking in
English law are consistent with the view that private law is, as Private Lawyers insist,
politically neutral.89 Now comes what I suspect will be a more controversial part of my
overall argument: we have seen that Dicey’s ideas were based on his economic
liberalism. I will now argue that these similarities show that despite Private Lawyers’
efforts to present private law as politically neutral, their conception of private law is
afflicted by similar political commitments.90
Though both parts of my overall argument are about the ‘political’ nature of the
Private Lawyers’ arguments, they are different. The part of the argument developed
in previous sections was political in the sense that it argued that the emergence of
private law has been a response to the Political Legitimacy Problem that arose in a
certain time and place. Here I argue that Private Lawyers’ work has been political in
something closer to the everyday sense of the word. These two arguments seem to be
in conflict with each other. In earlier sections I maintained that the separation of
private from public law was made for the sake of keeping law apart from politics; I
now suggest that in doing so Private Lawyers were adopting certain political
positions. Can the two claims be reconciled? I think they can, but it requires
attributing an error to the Private Lawyers. I think their error consists of believing
that their responses to the Problem of Political Legitimacy let them escape the
political fray, whereas in reality, their responses put them, consciously or not, right in
the middle of it. Such an error is most likely to happen when a certain political
ideology is presented as neutral, as common sense, or in our context, as merely
reflecting the values inherent in the common law.
We have already seen how Private Lawyers’ choices were defended as reflecting
common sense or apolitical expertise. Here I show how some of their implications
are politically contentious. Full treatment of this claim requires much more space
than I have here, but I can offer a couple of examples of the way Private Lawyers
have sought to shape the content of private law in a way that is not politically neutral
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but rather gives it the appearance of conceptual necessity so as to blunt potential
criticism of its political nature.91
My first example, one that I will discuss only briefly, deals with the claim that the
fundamental equality of the common law means that tort law must treat individuals
and public authorities in the same way. This view, which as we have seen, has a clear
forerunner in Dicey’s work, has resulted in a restrictive attitude towards liability of
public authorities, at least in comparison with some other jurisdictions. This view is
presented as a neutral position in that it treats all negligence defendants in the same
way, but this is an essentially libertarian position, which, as John Rawls put it, ‘[o]ne
noteworthy feature of [which] is that the state is just like any other private
association’.92 Given that individuals who find themselves in certain relations to each
other often have duties to act and protect others, the suggestion that the state has no
duties towards individuals and that whatever it does towards them is merely a
‘conferral of a benefit’, can only mean that public authorities stand in a relation of
complete strangers to the public. Whatever benefits the state provides is thus treated
as a form of charity, despite the fact, among other things, that the funding of public
authorities comes from the public. This is to treat the fundamental change in the
relation between individual and state that took place in the course of the twentieth
century (whether one likes it or not) as though it never happened. That is not a
politically neutral position.93
A more general point touches on what Dicey called ‘the individualism of the
common law’.94 Dicey made it a point to tout the common law’s continued
commitment to individualism as a shield against what he saw as the deleterious
effects of collectivism on self-reliance, and against legislative regulation for its
‘gradual and indirect’ detrimental impact on safety.95 Contemporary Private Lawyers
are perhaps less explicit but remarkably similar. They talk about the ‘rugged
individualism’ of the common law and the ‘premium’ it places ‘upon our freedom to
choose how we live our lives’.96 Now, ‘individualism’ means different things and there
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is no problem with accepting the idea that the common law typically involves
particular individuals’ claims against other particular individuals. But the alleged
individualism of the common law becomes much less neutral when we are told that
there is conceptual inconsistency between private law and the pursuit of ‘social
justice’, that any attempt of doing so is not a bad strategy or even bad morals, but
that it ‘manipulate[s]’ and ‘abuse[s]’ the law.97 Likewise, the individualism of the
common law is no longer politically neutral when we are told by Lord Hoffmann that
‘the individualist philosophy of the common law’ implies that ‘[p]eople of full age
and sound understanding must look after themselves and take responsibility for their
actions’.98 It is here that the political affinity between Dicey and the Private Lawyers
becomes apparent: Just as Dicey thought that there was some incongruity between
English law and ‘collectivism’, we are now told that we should not ‘twist and distort’
tort law in pursuit of ‘collective goals’.99 In other words, ‘individualism’ here is
shorthand for a particular, by no means uncontroversial, moral and political
position.100
To say that the common law is individualistic in this sense can mean one of two
things. One possibility is that there is something inherently individualistic about the
common law, that it cannot be anything but individualistic in this sense; the other is
that the common law is not necessarily individualistic, but that in actual practice it is.
For the Private Lawyers’ arguments to work the individualism must be somehow
necessarily inherent to the common law. It is only then that relying on its underlying
values might not fall foul of the Political Legitimacy Problem. (Even then, one might
argue that if the common law is necessarily politically biased, then it should be
abolished.) As it happens, however, this view is implausible. To see why, consider
another case in which Lord Hoffmann has spoken about the individualism of the
common law. In deciding whether tort liability should be imposed on a public
authority, he said, courts must decide upon the potential ‘cost, not only in money
but also in deprivation of liberty’ from limiting risks people are exposed to. This
‘balance between risk on the one hand and individual autonomy on the other’, he
added, ‘is not a matter of expert opinion. It is a judgment which the courts must
make and which in England reflects the individualist values of the common law.’101
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For the courts to develop the law on the basis of these values they must be somehow
non-political, and this is possible if the values are seen to be somehow already
embedded in the common law. To follow them then would be almost like following a
precedent. Only in this way can we reconcile the recognition that underlying the
common law is a particular political ideology with the claim that private law is a
matter of legal expertise: the judges use their knowledge of the vast content of the
law to identify the values embedded in it.
Unfortunately, this suggestion is difficult to accept. First, that these values are
somehow embedded in the common law does not make them less political and less
in need of political justification. Private Lawyers themselves believe that
‘individualism’ is true of the common law, but not of civilian private law.102 This
shows that English private law could have been different; and this means the claim
that the common law is individualistic is nothing more than a statement about the
political views of the people (judges, barristers, legal scholars) who have played the
most central role in developing its doctrines. Second, the different voices and
possibilities have not just existed outside the common law world. Competing voices
and interpretations of the values underlying the common law have always existed.
The cases and commentators thought ‘correct’ by the Private Lawyers are not so in
virtue of mere expertise, but rather reflect a normative choice to highlight certain
views of certain people at the expense of others.
If this is true, then the analogy I drew between Dicey’s conception of law and the
Private Lawyers’ conception of private law is complete: both have defended a
particular conception of law as reflecting the true nature of English law, when in fact
both views are derived, at least in part, from a certain political ideology. The
conclusion to draw from this is that by the Private Lawyers’ own lights, on the basis of
the arguments they themselves have made, the Diceyean ideology that is at the heart
of their understanding of contemporary private law renders their project political,
and as such, potentially illegitimate.
Let me draw out one little-noticed but significant implication of this. The only
remotely plausible response to the claims made here is that individualism has
become so much part of the common law that it is no longer open for judges to
change it. They must follow its implications and if whatever ideological change is
sought, it must come from the legislature. I have my doubts about this view (a view
does not become less political because of the passing of time), but even granting it, it
implies that the Private Lawyers can have no claim against calls for changing the
common law through legislation by those who wish to better protect values not
currently embedded in the common law. Moreover, claiming to be mere legal
experts, they can have nothing to say on whether such changes should be
introduced. And yet the Private Lawyers have been equally vociferous in their
opposition to calls for legislative reforms such as the adoption of a New Zealand-style
alternative to tort law, of no-fault liability to traffic accidents, or the expansion of the
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102
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negligence liability of public authorities.103 In this way the Private Lawyers have
completely sealed private law from reform they disapprove of: on the one hand, we
must accept individualism as somehow inherent in the nature of the common law; on
the other, we are told that legislative changes to the common law are undesirable,
because they politicize it. When presented in this way, the Private Lawyers’
preference for the common law over legislation appears, just like Dicey’s similar
preference, motivated by the belief that judges more than the legislature will stand
up for the values they favour.
Let me summarize the argument presented in this section from a slightly
different angle. There are two ways in which people have been defending private law.
One type of argument has been clearly political, coming from libertarians or classical
liberals who have contended that a greater share of our lives should be regulated by
private law.104 By contrast, there is the allegedly non-political work of scholars who
have defended private law on the basis of seemingly conceptual and taxonomical
arguments. If the argument in this essay is successful, the difference between these
two groups is, in fact, smaller than it seems.

VII
This essay has advanced two related but independent arguments. The first,
descriptive or interpretive, was concerned to explain the emergence of private law as
a distinct category of English law in the latter part of the twentieth century. I have
argued that contrary to the explanations offered by the Private Lawyers themselves,
the explanation for the pressure to distinguish private law from public law has been
political, and in particular the need to justify leaving the development of these areas
of law in the hands of the courts. That this approach had a political motivation,
however, does not yet show that it was committed to a particular political position.
My second argument went a step further and argued just that by showing the
similarity in the arguments offered by Dicey in support of his conception of law and
those of contemporary Private Lawyers.
One may accept the first argument and reject the second. Even if one accepts
only the first one, it reveals an important point that I hope should underlie future
discussions on private law: the divide between private law and public law is not part
of nature, or even the nature of law. But if one also accepts the second argument,
does that show that private law is illegitimate? Not necessarily. Private Lawyers’ own
position rests on two premises, one that acknowledges the potential problem of
legitimacy in leaving private law in the hands the courts and a second that contends
that their understanding of this area of law provides an adequate response to the
103
See Law Commission, n. 85, §2.9 (reporting that Stevens and Hoffmann ‘disagreed
vigorously’ with suggestions for legislative reform).
104
F.A. Hayek, The Mirage of Social Justice (1977) 31 (talking about a ‘private law society’
as what ‘makes an Open Society possible’); R.A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World
(1995). At a slightly further remove see R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) ch. 7. The
clearest exponent of this view in the history of English law is probably Baron Bramwell.

23

challenge. My argument challenged the second premise, and it did so on the basis of
the Private Lawyers’ own work. That does not yet show that there are no other
responses to the challenge of legitimacy. What it does show, however, is the need to
justify private law on the basis of moral and political premises. Such work would have
to offer substantive arguments for the superiority of a certain view of private law and
institutional arguments addressing concerns about the political legitimacy of
unelected judges continuing to be given the central role in developing certain areas
of law. It may be (although, admittedly, I do not think so) that there is a good
argument of this sort to justify something not very different from the Private Lawyers’
conception of private law. The impossible dream is the belief that one could
somehow answer (or avoid) these questions exclusively by analysing concepts and
past cases.
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